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INTRODUCTION
In-flight maintenance, as conceived and preplanned for the Skylab
mission, was limited to simple scheduled and unscheduled replacement tasks and
minor contingency repair. Tools and spares were provided accordingly. The
scheduled In-flight maintenance activities were held to a minimum In order to
conserve crew time for maximum experiment activities. Requirements were
established only where periodic cleaning or replacement of consumable, cycle
sensitive or time sensitive items were necessary. These maintenance require-
ments were included in the crew checklists as part of the normal housekeeping
tasks. Performance of the tasks was controlled by the flight plan and scheduled
to accommodate crew workload. Table 1 is a list of the 16 scheduled in-flight
maintenance tasks which were preplanned for the Skylab mission. Tasks per-
formed were much the same as planned, although a number of unscheduled
in-flight maintenance activities were carried out. Maintenance capability was
provided for the purpose of replacing failed components, installing auxiliary
and backup hardware, and servicing and repairing equipment. This service was
provided in the form of spares, tools, and procedures for performing 160
different unscheduled tasks. Representative tasks are listed in Table 2. Skylab
crews performed many of these unscheduled maintenance tasks during the three
missions. It is interesting to note that no major problems were encountered in
the performance of the preplanned scheduled and unscheduled tasks. Tools,
spares, procedures, and training were adequate.
MAJOR FAILURES REQUIRING CONTINGENCY MAINTENANCE
In addition to the capability for scheduled and unscheduled in-flight main-
tenance, tools and materials were placed on board to provide a general main-
tenance capability. This capability was provided to permit repair of failed
equipment for which no specific in-flight maintenance activity was anticipated.
Contingencies did develop during the missions which required using the onboard
support equipment but for which procedures had to be developed in real time
and uplinked to the crew. Other contingencies developed for which onboard
maintenance support was inadequate, thus additional tools and equipment were
launched aboard the three Command/Service Modules (CSMs).
v
r"	,
TABLE 1. SCHEDULE OF PRCPLANNED IN-FLIGIIT
MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
Task Description 
Planned
Frequency
Vacuum Clean ECS Inlet Screens
OWS Air Mixing Chamber 7 clays
AIDA Fans 7 days
AM Circulating Pans 7 days
WMC Debris Coarse Filter 7 days
Replace WIVIC Vent Unit k'ine Filter 7 days
Replace Shower Filter 7 days
Replace Mel Sieve Solids Traps 11 days
Replace Inlet COZ Detector Cartridges 14 days
Replace WMC Vent Fine/Coarse Filters 28 days
Replace Fecal Collector Filter 28 days
Replace Urine Separator Filter 28 days
Replace Mol Sieve Charcoal Canister 28 : ays
Replace WMC Filter and Charcoal Cartridge 28 days
Replace Outlet CO2 Detector Cartridge 28 days
Replace PP02 Sensor SL-3 and 4 Activation
Replace ATM C&D Cooling Water Filter Before and After EREPb
Operation SL-2
Replace EVA/IVA Gas Coolant Separator SL-3 and 4 Activation
Replace Urine Separator SL-2 and 3 Deactivation
Vacuum Clean OWS Solenoid Vent Filter SL-3 and 4 Activation
a. ECS — Electrical Control System
MDA — Multiple Docking Adapter
AM — Airlock Module
WMC — Waste Management Compartment
ATM — Apollo Telescope Mount
b. EREP — Earth Resources Experiment Package
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TABLE 2. REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLING Or UNSCHEDULED
IN-FLIGHT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
Waste Manaremont System
Replace urine separator
Replace urine separator motor
Clean trash airlock vent valve filter
Replace trash airlock pressure gauge seal and O-rings
Environmental Control System
Replace ventilation fan
Replace molecular sieve solids trap and charcoal canister
Replace condensing heat exchanger water separator plates
Replace WMC filter and charcoal cartridge
Instrumentation and Communications System
Replace speaker Intercom assembly
Replace crewman communication umbilical
Replace teluprinter assembly
Replace AM tape recorder
Plater System
Replace hot water dispenser
Replace ward room water hose
Service/deservice water systems
Replace ward room water heater
Electrical System
Replace 5190 window heater control unit and cable
Replace general illumination flood lights
Install Skylab to CSI4 contingency power cable
Replace urine separator cable assembly
Structures System
Contingency opening of hatches
Replace habitation area vent plug
Contingency opening ATM aperture doors
Release or adjust locker and freezer doors
Experiment Systems
Replace ATM manual pointing controller
Replace mass measuring device electronics module
Replace ergometer drive assembly
Install EREP diagnostic downlink unit
3
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Approximately 30 contingency maintenance tasks were performed by ilia
Skylab craws; Table 3 lists those tasks by mission. Many of those Involved
major repairs to the cluster systems to permit continuation of the mission or to
avoid signif:,ant compromises in attaining mission objectives. The locations of
major repair activities are shown in Pirure 1.
Six of these major system repairs have been selected for detailed dis-
cussion in this paper:
1. Release of the Orbital Workshop (OWS) solar array that failed to
deploy.
2. Deployment of the parasol sun shield.
3. Deployment of the twin-pole sun shield.
4. Installation of the rate gyro package.
5. Coolant system reservicing.
G. 5193 antenna repair.
These six were selected to represent the wide range of complicated and sophis-
ticated repairs performed and include the release and deployment of a large
structure, the assembly and deployment of large mechanical devices, the
Installation and checkout of precision electronic equipment, tapping into and
recharging a closed loop fluid system and the troubleshooting and repair of
precision electromechanical equipment. They also are representative of intra-
vehicular (IVA) and extravehicular (EVA) activities requiring crew teamwork
with close procedural coordination.
RELEASE OF SOLAR ARRAY WING
Sixty-three seconds after lift-off, abnormal meteoroid shield and work-
shop solar array indications were received showing that the shield tension straps
had separated and that solar array wing 2 was in an "insecure" position. This
meant the shield and solar array had deployed prematurely. Analysis of
subsequent data indicated that the meteoroid shield was lost and that apparently	 =` d
one solar array wing was gone completely and the other was only partially
deployed.
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TABLE 3. CONTINGENCY MAINTENANCE TASKS BY MISSION
(IN ORDER OP OCCURRENCE)
SL-2
Parasol thermal shield deployment
Experiment 5019 extension mechanism repair
Lubrication of ergometer pedals
OWS solar array wing deployment
Experiments T027/5073 backup tripod mounting
C13RM ii15 contingency procedure
SL-3
Twin pole sail (thermal shield) deployment
Experiment 5055 door ramp latch removal
Airlock module tape recorder disassembly
Mark 1 exerciser repair
Condensate system leak check
Coolant system Vak check
Rate gyro paekagu installation
Experiment S082A door ramp latch removal
Experiment 5056 door ramp latch removal
Ergometer pedal screw replacement
OWS heat exchanger cleaning
Video tape recorder circuit board removal
Condensate dump probe troubleshooting
Experiment 5192 attenuator adjustment
SL-4
Urine drawer seal replacement
Primary coolant loop servicing
Rate gyro package thermometer installation
Experiment 5193 antenna repair
ATM TV monitor No. 1 replacement
Experiment 5082}3 auxiliary timer installation
Experiment 5009 drive motor replacement
Mark 1 exerciser repair
Liquid/gas separator installation in the ATM C&D coolant loop
Experiment 5054 filter wheel positioning
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Figure 1. locations of major maintenance activities.
While it could not be determined if the entire meteoroid shield had come
off, the temperature increase in the Orbital Workshop (OWS) after orbit was
reached confirmed that essentiall y, nc ► nc of the anticipated thermal protection
was bein;; provided. The Skylab, through analysis and experimentation, was
placed in an attitude to minimize heating of the interior by solar radiation. In
the coca itime, the Apollo 'Telescope . ►count (AT11) solar arrays were deployed
successfully and provided 1 ►ower to maintain the spacecraft in the unactivated
mode.
The launch of the first crew, cm Sk 'vlab 'L, was delayed 10 clays to permit
design, lahrication, and testing of ways to release the OWS solar array and to
provide a thermal shield that would reduce the internal temperatures to a
habitable level.
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Work on ways of frc • cinl; and deploYing the solar arary beam was begun
immediately. li was , , ulatcd that the restraining debris existed in the form
of bolts, sheet metal, and metal straps. Consequently. a decision was made to
concentrate on shear-type sheet metal cutters and cable cutters. 'fools were
fabricated, tested, used I'm- crew trainity; and demonstration. and launched with
the first C SNI.
After the Sl.-2 crew performed their rendezvous with the Skvlab, they
did a fly -around inspection describing the condition of the damage and making
photNraphs. Live TV coverage was transmitted to the ground for 15 min. The
crew confirmed that the meteoroid shield was missing, OWS solar arra 'v wins;
was missin;;, and that solar array wink I was partialiv ilk- d. Nigurc
shows a view of the damaged SkYlab.
CiP,	 2. Skylab 2 fly-around inspection. (View of damaged
workshop showiIlg untihielded area where parasol was
later deploYed. The jammed scdar wing Li at
lower right. )
Oki P() ,IJ PA CI,^UR Q1
41,17'Y
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Figure :3 shows solar array wing; I partially deployed. Closer inspecticn
by the crew revealed that the solar array mean ► was restrain( d by a small piece
of aluminum alloy strap from the meteoroid shield. The crew attempted to free
the wins; during a standup 1:VA fron ► the C'S111, using a :3.04 ill ( to It) pole Nvith
a hoof: oil 	 end for prying and pulling. This attempt failed and the wing;
deployment activities were deferred to a latt • r EVA. lleanwhile work was still
in progress on procedures to I)c used to free the solar array wing. The fly-
around television pictures and crew description of the damage provided thy•
basis foe the procedures. This contingency repair involved releasing the beam
by cutting the aluminuiu ,trap and deploying; the bean ► to the nor ► nal operation
position. The procedures were developed and demonstrated in the neutral
buoyancy facilit;; at the :Marshall Space Flight Center (:11SFC) with astronauts
using tools identical to those oil
Figure .,. Solar array wing I partially deployed.
On Jane 7, 1973, the Commander and Science Pilot spent nearly four
hours in perhaps the most. difficult and daring of all orbital repair j •-,bs. T'-c
task was especially con—licated by the absence of EVA aids in the area of the
solar array beam. Figure 4 shows the aluminum strap holding the beam. The
crew translated to the W:ec; airlock shroud ai • tra an(] assembled a tool made up
of a 7.6 in (25 ft) pole with a rope operated cutter on one end. Figure 5 shows
OIi IGI,7
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this cutter tool being tested by MSPC engineers. The cutter end was attached
to the debris and the Commander, using the pole as an aid, translated to the
cutter end. Then, with the Commander managing the cutter, the Science Pilot
cut the aluminum strap using the rope for control. A typical sample of the
aluminum strip that held the solar wing is shown in Figure 6.
After release, the beam deployed out to about 20 deg and stopped. This
was predictable since the beam damper-actuator was below the freezing tempera-
ture of its fluid. In anticipation of this the crew had installed a tether between
f	 the vent module and a strut in the fixed airlock shroud area. A crewman then}f	 stood up under the tether as shown in Figure 7. The tension thuL , applied to the
solar wing broke loose the frozen damper-actuator that still held the wing,
t4	 permitting the wing to swing out and lock into place.
PARASOL DEPLOYMENT
Many viable schemes for recovering the lost thermal control were
postulated. During the 10 day period between May 15 and May 25, 1973, a
herculean effort was mounted, not only by NASA but by contractors as well.
Johnson Space Center ( JSC) designed a parasol thermal shield to fit in
a small canister that had been designed to house an experiment to be deployed
through the scientific airlock. It operated much as a normal parasol, having
four logs and a center post. The center post was held by the crew in the work-
shop, and the telescoping legs were shoved out through the canister extending
through the +Z scientific airlock. The legs were spring loaded so that all four 	 ^.
legs extended when they cleared the canister. Another JSC concept was to let
the crew rig a shield while standing in the open Command Module hatch. The
crew was to take a fabric shield and, using poles with hooks at their ends,
attach pulleys and ropes to the Saturn Workshop to rig up a shade. This concept
l
	
	
seemed simple, but the necessity for keeping the Command Module close to the
Saturn Workshop and uncertainty of the crew's being able to tie the shield firmly
using a pole led to retaining this concept only as an alternate method.
`
	
	 MSFC developed a thermal shield concept which required the crew to
perform an EVA, going outside and hanging a fabric thermal shield from a
twin-pole A-frame. The top of the A-frame would be attached at the solar
observatory work station, then the 16 . 76 m (55 ft) long poles would be extended
down the side of the workshop. and the thermal shield would be stretched between
the poles.
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Figure 6. Sample segment of the aluminum (Al 7075-'r6) strip
that held the solar wing.
Figure 7. Standup operation used to finally erect the wire.
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As the concepts for the thermal shield were developed it became obvious
that only three versions would be ready for the mission day 12 launch of the
crew, These were the parasol, the shield deployed from the Command Module,
and the twin-pole shield. Development continued and on mission day 9 the crew
for the first manned period entered the neutral buoyancy tank for training in
deployment of the shields. On mission day 10, a formal examination was held
of all the materials testing, failures, analyses, deployment procedures, and
everything assrciated with the design of the three thermal shields. On the
basis of this review it was decided to use the parasol as the primary device and
to deploy the twin-pole at some later time, if required. The parasol was
favored because it could be deployed from inside the Skylab. Concern had been
expressed about potential problems in performing an EVA too early in the
mission. The shield to be rigged from the Command Module was also to be
stowed in the Command Module as a contingency device.
One of the first tasks after entering the Skylab was the deployment of the
parasol thermal shield. The canister containing the parasol was mounted to the
scientific airlock on the sun side of the OWS supported by the tripod provided
for experiment support. Deployment was accomplished by attaching the five
sections of the extension rod, one at a time, until the parasol extended far
enough out of the scientific airlock to permit release of the four telescoping rods,
which in turn deployed the shield. After the shield was deployed, the extension
rod was pulled back inside, securing the parasol next to the OWS external sur-
face. The extension rod was removed and stowed. Figure S showy
 the deploy-
ment sequence in cutaway views and Figure 9 shows the sequence of deployment
as viewed from the outside.
The shade, or parasol as it was called, was designed to cover an area
6.70 by 7.31 m (22 by 24 ft). Although it had a few wrinkles, it covered about
90 percent of the proposed area and brought inside temperatures to near normal
in about 2 days. In about 11 days, the inside temperature was a comfortable
75 degrees Fahrenheit (23.9°C) . Figure 10 shows the Skylab with the parasol
in place.
SAIL DEPLOYMENT
As the mission progressed and data from ground tests on the thermal
shield were evaluated, a decision was made that the second Skylab crew should
deploy the MSFC thermal shield "twin-pole sail" over the parasol.,
12
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Figure 10. External view of Skylab showing parasol.
The I%ISFC sail had been designed, tested, and shipped to KSC in the
hectic 10 day period after the Skylab launch on May 14, 197:3, and was launched
with the first crew for possible future use. Although a number of designs and
material combinations were constructed and tested, the final sail configuration
was rectangular, measuring 6.78 m (22 ft 3 in. ) by 7.4 m (24 ft 5 in.) .
Around the perimeter a 6 mm (0.25 in.) diameter polybenzimidazole (I)BI)
rope was sewn into a channel. The material composition of the sail is given
below:
11'01)	 5 mil thick S- 13G applied to 2.5 mil
International Orange ripstop nylon
( sun side)
Middle	 Vapor deposited aluminum approximately 2000 A
Bottom	 0.25 mil Mylar
Weight	 19.5 kg (4:3 lb) (flight packed)
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On August 5, 1973, the SL.-3 crew began preparation for an EVA which
would Involve retrieving and installing film and also attaching the MSFC twin_
pole solar sail. Prior to the EVA, the parasol was lowered as close to the
Workshop wall as possible. The deployment procedure for the sail began
August 6, 1973, with the Pilot translating himself through the airlock hatch to
the ATM side, parallel to the damaged side of the Workshop, and mounted
temporary foot restraints to the ATM hand rails (near an outrigger). When the
foot restraints were in place and the Pilot was properly positioned, the Science
Pilot, using the onboard extendible boom (for use on other EVAs), transferred
to the Pilot a base plate fitting especially designed to hold the two sail poles In
position over the Workshop. While the Pilot was clamping the base plate to an
ATM outrigger, the Science Pilot, standing near the open airlock hatch, began
assembling a 16.76 in 	 ft) pole from eleven 1.52 to (5 ft) sections, feeding
the pole as he built it to the Pilot, who by this time was ready to receive it. The
Pilot's position during this entire pro,,edure was only slightly different from the
one occupied during a normal EVA for replacing film canisters. After receiving
the first pole, he positioned the base end into one of the two receptacles, or
sockets, ("V" shaped) on the base plate. The second pole was received and
attached in like manner in the other socket. As can be seen in figure 11, a
simple sketch of the pole, the and of the outward section of each pole has an
eyelet through which is threaded a continuous loop rope. After the Science Pilot
had transferred the sail package to the Pilot, he then hooked two corners of the
folded sail onto the pole ropes (attach rings on rope). He then gradually pulled
the ropes, alternately, sending the sail out along the poles in a manner similar
to raising a flag. After full extension of the sail, the other two remaining ends
of the sail were extended and tied off with ropes to the ATM outrigging.
A,	 HOOK
PLATE	 HOPE
Figure 11. Sail pole as it appears attached to the
base plate on the ATM strut.
Figure 12 is a sketch of the deployed sail and Figure 13 is an actual view
of the attached sail.
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l igurc 12. Sketch of sail deployment.
Figure 13. Skylab cluster with attached Nail.
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RATE GYRO PROCESSOR
The attitude and pointing control system (APCS) used integrating rate
gyroscopes to sense spacecraft attitude rates. The gyros wore mounted
individually In a rate gyro processor (RGP) which contained, in addition to the
gyro, a power supply, heater and control, 4800 liz generator, three-phase
Inverter, ac amplifier, demodulator and torque driver. There were Varce of
the RGPs per vehicle axis used in a compare-and-spare redundancy management
scheme.
Following switchover from launch vehicle attitude control to Skylab con-
trol, it became apparent that some of the RGPs were behaving abnormally. The
redundancy management rate integral discompares showed that several RGPs
had out-of-spec drift. Additionally, telemetry showed that the Z i RGP was
excessively hot. The drift rates were as high as 18 deg/hour., two orders of
magnitude above specificrtion. The high drift rates made It difficult to maintain
the correct attitude for thermal control during the first 10 days after SL-1
launch. The high drift rates were compensated for by changes in the ATMDC
software uplinked from the ground; however, the drift rates often changed
suddenly. This caused difficulty until the new rates could be measured and
compensated. As time passed in the mission, the magnitude of the drift rate
changes decreased. Eventually the X i , Y 1 , and Z 3 RGPs became stable and
were used through the remainder of the mission.
After considerable investigation, it was found that the high drift rates
were caused by gas bubbles In the rate gyro flotation fluid. The formation of
bubbles in the fluid was apparently caused by a design deficiency which exposed
the float chamber bellows to the hard vacuum of space and by entrained gases
present in the flotation fluid. Corrective action included tests to verify the
theory of bubble formation and a design modification which scaled the float
cavity from the hard vacuum of space. The design modification consisted of
replacing the vented bellows end up cap with an unvented end cap so that internal
float pressure would remain near the original float fill pressure despite external
pressure changes.
Within the first 21 hours of the mission, four RGPs were overheating.
Subsequently, two more showed identical symptoms. A detailed thermal analysis
was performed relating RGP base plate heat sink temperatures of 11GP tempera-
tures. It was determined that base plate temperatures of 14° C corresponded to
RGP temperatures of about 110' C. Also, a hot RGP was powered down, allowed
to cool, and then powered up. The RGP temperature was seen to increase and
become off-scale high. It was concluded that the six RGPs In question had
17
experienced heater control failures and that the lWP temperatures wer o about
IOW C. "There was much concern that as the RG1' temperatures increased, the
RGPs would become unstable and cause loss of control. Test and analysis dal
indicated that the RGP stability margin expected at 67.8° C would disappear at
11(p C because of the reduction in float clamping fluid viscosity. It was expected
that normal increases in solar elevation angle during the mission would cause
increased RGP base plate temperatures and higher RGP temperatures.
During SL-2 an expedited effort was begun to prepare a package of RGPs
that could be added to the APCS sh,)uld additional failures threaten the program.
This package containing six RGPs became knimwn as the "six-pack." The gyros
in this package contained a design fix for th y• bubble problem encountered in
flight. It was decided to mount the six-pack in the MDA on a mount provided for
an experiment. This location was close to the center of gravity, cot.ld be
aligned within limits, was close to the AT11I control and display console for
system interconnect, and was near a high power outlet. The installation
required .VA and EVA with participation of all three crewmen. The rate gyro
six-pact: was mounted in the 111DA as shown in I•'igure 14 and was connected to
the ATNI control and display console.
•
•
Figure 14. The six gyros mounted in the backup AIDA hardware.
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The ranimander remained inside while the Science Pilot and Pilot wont
outside to complete the installation which required the disconnecting of three
cable connectors and the installation of the new cable and rate gyro selector
box which required connecting four c-nnnectors. The external cable and selector
box are shown in Figure 15. The internal and external cable connections are
shown In Figure 16.
The first connection broken was at the trunnion plate. The APCS was
turned off by the Commander Just prior to disconnecting this cable and was
turned on again after the Installation was complete. A special set of pliers for
use In disconnecting and connecting the electrical connectors had been developed
and was oil board. The installation was accomplished successfully permitting
the APCS to return to normal operations.
COOLANT SYSTEM RESERVICING
On the ninth day of SL-3, a coolant leak in the primary coolant loop was
Indicated by n low pump inlet pressure warning. Ground analysis indicated a
long term decrease In pressure. The crew attemmed to ascertain the location
of the coolant leak by removing panels and unwrapping insulation from suspect
lines. Wrapped lines wore visually Inspected for bulging, color changes, and
wetness but no evidence of leakage was found. During LVA, the crew Inspected
the accessible exterior areas, especially the radiators, for evidence of coolant
leakage but none wav found.
On the 27th day of SL-3 the primary loop was shut down to prevent pump
cavitation and possible damage after the pump inlet pressure had reached a low
of 3.45 N/cm 2 (5 Asia). Flight data also indicated that the secondary loop
possibly was leaking but was still operational and providing the required cooling.
The leakage.  rate was determined to be so small that the coolant loops could
remain operational by replenishing the coolant. Since the coolant loops were
not designed for onboard reservicing, efforts were initiated by ground personnel
to devise a way to reservice the loops, develop the hardware and demonstrate
Its capability in time for launch of SL-4.
The procedure developed included stripping insulation from a coolant
line near the cabin heat exchanger in the airlock module, piercing the line with
a saddle valve assembly (Fig. 17) which had a quick disconnect for attaching a
service hose and forcing coolant from a small storage tank by applying pressure
from a 24.13.N/cm 2 (35 psi) source through a bellows arrangement. Parts for
the reservice equipment were primarily qualified by similarity to equipment
used in other A irlock Module applications. The tank was adapted from a
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Figure 15. HGP EVA cable assembly and selector ix)x.
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Command Module fuel tank. Figure 1r, shows the resorvice system schemat-
ically. The tank was launched with 19.05 kg (42 lb) of coolant.
The in-flight servicing began on the fourth day of SL-4 and progressed
smoothly through a saddle valve checkout. This involved attaching the saddle
valve and ilia leak test hose to the 24.1 N/em 2 (35 psi) GN 2 supply. The
purpose of the leak check procedure was to verify that the saddle valve was not
leaking prior to penetration. The leak check procedure involved pressurizing
the saddle valve and leak check hose to a pressure greater than 20.08 N/cm2
(30 psig), closing the supply valve in the 18.24 m (00 ft) servicing hose, and
monitoring for 30 min. If the pressure decay was less than 1.38 N/cm2
(2 psi), the servicing was to proceed. However, the leak test hose gage
indicated an initial pressure of 22.75 N/cm 2 (33 psi) and 35 min later 21.03
N/em 2 (30.5 psi). After an additional. 20 min, the pressure was down to 17.23
N/cm 2 (25 psi) . Thus, a leak was indicated in the saddle valve or the leak check
hose. To determine the location of the leak, the crew was instructed to dis-
connect the leak check hose from the saddle valve and to repressurize the leak
check hose. The leak check hose alone showed a pressure drop of 1.38 N/cm2
(2 psi), indicating a leak. The crew was then instructed to disconnect the
leak check hose from the servicing hose and to connect the coolant servicing
tank and the coolant servicing hose. The system was carefully checked out and
the coolant valves were then opened to supply coolant to ilia saddle valve under
pressure prior to piercing of the coolant line. No coolant leakage was observed;
the primary coolant line was then pierced and the servicing proceeded
satisfactorily.
The reservicing of the primary loop permitted return to the two loop
operation of the coolant system during the periods of high beta angles and EVA
(high heat load periods).
5193 ANTENNA REPA I R
On the seventh day of SL-4 the Science Pilot and Pilot perfornned the
first of four EVAs of the SL-4 mission. The total duration of the EVA was
0.5 hours with the last 3.5 hours dedicated to a repair of 5193, the Microwave
Radiometer Scatterometer Altimeter. The 5193 experiment was a complex
electronic active and passive microwave radar instrument with a two-axis
gimbaled antenna which viewed the earth as part of the Earth Resources Experi-
ment Package. It was mounted external to the Skylab vehicle on the Airlock
Module trur s. Figure 19 shows the antenna in a flight configuration.
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Figurc 19. ~19:3 antenna.
A failure occurred earlier during ERE.1' peas 40 on mission day 49 of
SL -:l which manifested itself by erratic antenna motion. A subsequent in-orbit
SL-:i telemetry test gave ground engineers additional data to analyze the
problem and lx:gin working toward a solution. A -10 volt reference in the
gimbal servo system was found to he at -1.0 volt. Circuit anaiysis indicated
that the failure was most likely a short in either the pitch or roll gimbal poten-
tiometers, or both. These potentiometers were accessible from outside the
experiment ( Fig. 19). Folloxvinh the analysis, NASA decided to perform an
E:VA to attempt to correct this problem and at least get partial use of the S19:1
experiment.
A procedure was developed and tested by the SL-4 astronauts in the
neutral buoyancy tank at MSFC. Specialized hardware was prepared which
included a jumper box for isolation of the short, a too] pouch with appropriate
repair tools, and astronaut restraints. When the E:VA occurred, the three
astronauts worked together very closely. The Science Pilot and Pilot shared
the work outside. lF rom the inside, the Commander advised them of the besi
wort: position and nearness to such delicate items as the antenna feed and the
519()A window. IIt• also assisted in the functional testing by operating the E111-:1)
c
control switches from inside the vehicle. The astronauts followed the proce-
dure as written, based oil planned logic diagram shown in Figure 20. The
actual steps followed are shown in Figure 21.
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Chronological highlights of the procedures were that the astronauts trans-
lated to the area near the 5193 gimbals, inspected them and removed a sliver of
Insulation material from inside the pitch gimbal. They performed functional
testing to see if the removal of the sliver corrected the problem. When they
found it had not, they removed three flight cable connetions and installed the
jumper box (Pig. 22) for isolation of the short. They ran another malfunction
test which isolated the short to the pitch axis only. With this determination the
procedure required removal of a launch pin and installation of a manual gimbal
lock (Pig. 23) . To free the launch lock, they had to tap it with a hammer a few
times. This two-man operation required visually aligning a hole in the pitch
gimbal housing with a hole in the pitch gimbal shaft by rotating the antenna to a
mechanical null position. Additionally, they put a disabling plug (Pig. 24) on
the launch lock circuit which prevented power from being applied to the pitch
electrical circuitry during operation of EREP for the rest of the mission.
During the repair operation it was necessary to uncover the surfaces of
the experiment of the aluminized Mylar thermal insulation for access to the
hardware. The insulation was held in place by means of 19 mm (0.75 in.)
aluminized tape and velcro. The tape adhesive froze, rendering the tape useless
during replacement of the insulation, but the astronauts commented on how well
the velcro worked. Throughout the operation, although they had foot restraints,
it was ncessary for them to physically move each other around to provide the
best access to the work at hand. On completion of this task the 5193 experiment
had approximately 80 percent of its preflight functions restored.
CONCLUSIONS
The Skylab experience in the successful conduct of planned and contin-
gency repairs proved conclusively that man in space can maize major systems
repairs using standard or special tools. Essentially, any repair or maintenance
that logistically fits an operations activity can be performed. Procedures for
contingency repairs can be developed and demonstrated on the ground, trans-
mitted to and satisfactorily performer] by the crew already in space.
Design of future spacecraft should acknowledge this almost limitless
capability and provide for more extensive in-flight repair and maintenance.
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